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INTRODUCTION

When April Roller began making repeated trips to the restroom because of
morning sickness and pregnancy-related dizziness, her supervisor told her that
her employer did not "pay [her] to pee."' Rather than accommodating her need
for more frequent restroom visits, the supervisor offered to buy her a larger
wastebasket "so that she could take care of vomiting without having to visit the
bathroom or leave her seat."' Similarly, a sales associate was denied permission
to carry a water bottle, which she needed for her pregnancy-related urinary tract
and bladder infections. 3 A cashier was denied permission to use a stool, which
1.
2.

3.

98

First Amended Complaint at 4, Roller v. Nat'1 Processing of Am., Inc., No. 2:12-cv02746 (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2013).
Id.
Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. o8-1244, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48020, at *I2 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009).
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she needed because her doctor had forbidden her to stand for more than six hours
at a time because of pregnancy-related circulation problems. 4 A nursing home
activity director was denied accommodation when her doctor imposed lifting restrictions to prevent miscarriage, despite the fact that lifting was a minor part of
her job with which her co-workers were willing to help.5 All four women eventually lost their jobs.
It is remarkable that such scenarios persist a quarter century after pregnancy
discrimination became illegal with the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA), which amended Title VII to make clear that discrimination based on
pregnancy is discrimination because of sex.' In spite of the PDA's express prohibition of pregnancy discrimination, many pregnant women in need of accommodation continue to be fired outright. Others are forced to take family leave
much earlier than necessary. As a result, their leaves often run out before they are
7
ready to return to work and they are terminated for job abandonment.
This type of employer conduct is now often prohibited as a result of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA).' Enacted in 20o8,
the ADAAA's aim was to broaden coverage in accordance with the intention of
the original ADA. 9 Many pregnancy-related impairments now are covered disabilities."o This statutory change effectively supersedes prior case law, which virtually never afforded pregnant women accommodations under the ADA." Today,
the basic principle is simple: The cause of an impairment-whether rooted in
pregnancy or not-is irrelevant to the determination of whether that impairment
constitutes a disability under the Act. The ADA makes no distinction between

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 551o, at *2 (E.D. Pa.

4.

Flores v. Home Depot, Inc., No.
Apr. 4, 2003).

5.

Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 545-47 (7th Cir. 2011).
Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § zoooe(k)

6.

01-6908,

2003

(2012)).

7.

See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961,

8.

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,

1005-o6 (2013).

at 42 U.S.C. §
9.

io.

122

Stat. 3553

(2008)

(codified

12101 (2012)).

122 Stat. at 3554 (stating that the purpose of the ADAAA is to "carry
out the ADA's objectives ... by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA").
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (2011) (stating that pregnancy is not an impairment

Id. § 2(b)(i),

but that a substantially limiting pregnancy- related impairment is a disability).
ni.

See Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability"and the Amended Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 444-46 (2012).
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pregnancy-related conditions and conditions not related to pregnancy." Indeed,
to create such an artificial distinction would violate the legal mandate to treat
pregnant workers the same as other workers "similar in their ability or inability
to work."" To take but one example, carpal tunnel syndrome is common among
pregnant women and also is widespread among nonpregnant individuals. 4 The
ADA affords an accommodation right to individuals with carpal tunnel syndrome regardless of whether the condition stems from pregnancy or from a different medical condition.
This Article explains how the changes effected by the ADAAA entitle women
to a broad range of accommodations for their pregnancy-related conditions under federal law." Part I documents the historical obstacles faced by plaintiffs

12.

See 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2(h) app

13.

42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2012).

14.

See Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Fact Sheet, NAT'L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS
& STROKE, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/carpal-tunnel/carpal-tunnel.htm
(last visited Dec. 13, 2013).

15.

Some state laws also give employees the right to pregnancy accommodations. See
ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.520(a) (2013) (entitling public officers who are pregnant to
request a transfer to a less hazardous position); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12945(a)(1)-(3)
(West 2013) (requiring employers to (i) provide reasonable temporary transfers to
pregnant employees to a "less strenuous or hazardous position" with the advice of
a physician; (2) provide reasonable unpaid leave for up to four months for a pregnancy-related disability; and (3) grant pregnant workers "reasonable accommodation" for a "condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-6o(a)(7)(B)-(G) (2013) (obligating employers to (i)
make a "reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable temporary position" if the employee reasonably believes that continued employment in
her position might cause injury to the employee or fetus; (2) provide notice of the
right to transfer; and (3) provide reasonable unpaid leave for pregnancy-related disabilities); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102(H) (2013) (applying only to peace officers and firefighters and requiring employers to provide pregnant employees with
reasonable temporary transfers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:342(4) (2012) (forbidding
an employer from refusing "to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee to
a less strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if she so
requests, with the advice of her physician, where such transfer can be reasonably
accommodated," and assuming the employee is otherwise qualified); MINN. STAT.
§ 363A.o8 Subd. 5, 6 (West 2013) (requiring employers to "treat women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or disabilities related to pregnancy or childbirth, the same as
other persons who are not so affected but who are similar in their ability or inability
to work, including a duty to make reasonable accommodations"); TEX. Loc. GOv'T
CODE ANN. § 18o.oo4(b)-(c) (West 2007) (entitling pregnant county and municipality employees to reasonable temporary transfers, and obligating employers of
such employees to "make a reasonable effort to accommodate an employee" who
is "partially physically restricted by a pregnancy"); HAW. CODE R. §§ 12-46-107(c)

100

(2011).
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claiming a right to accommodation for conditions caused by pregnancy. Part II
begins by explaining the history and purpose of the ADAAA. It then illustrates
two ways in which the ADAAA expands accommodation rights. First, it directly
expands accommodation rights under the ADA by broadening the definition of
impairment. We call this the "impairment theory." Second, it indirectly expands
accommodation rights under the PDA by expanding the group of similarly situated workers to whom a plaintiff can point to prove discriminatory treatment.
We call this the "comparator theory." Part III looks at several pregnancy cases
decided under the ADAAA to date. These cases suggest that, despite an initial
period of confusion, courts have begun to recognize that the ADA now offers
accommodations for many pregnant women.' Part IV compares the relative
benefits of filing a claim under either the PDA or the ADA, and explores which
cause of action will offer the most protection. The Article concludes by providing
some examples of pregnancy-related conditions and explaining how working
women with these conditions are entitled to accommodation under the ADAAA.
This Part highlights the parallels between common pregnancy-related conditions
and non-pregnancy-related conditions, a theme upon which we elaborate in the
Appendix to this Article.
I.

HISTORICAL OBSTACLES TO PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION

Before the enactment of the ADAAA, women had little success obtaining
necessary workplace accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions. This
was due in part to the prevalence of outdated perceptions of pregnancy and
women in the workplace-and, in particular, the presumption that motherhood
and a commitment to one's job are incompatible.

16.

(Lexis 2013) (providing that "[a]n employer shall make every reasonable accommodation to the needs of the female affected by disability due to and resulting from
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions").
See, e.g., Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc., No.11 C 8480, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1oo965 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013) (holding that the short duration of plaintiff's pregnancy-related condition did not preclude it from being a disability under the
ADAAA); Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-o817,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3273 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013) (finding plasuible a plaintiffs
disability claim arising from pregnancy-related complications ); Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012)

(finding that pregnancy complications may fall within the ADA's definition of disability). But see, e.g., Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.
Conn. 2012) (finding that complications from pregnancy rarely constitute a disability); Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-cv-4938, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83586 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (finding that pregnancy is covered only in "extremely
rare" cases); Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-456-T-33, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79265 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2012) (denying employee's claim that she was disabled due
to pregnancy).
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Neither the ADA nor the PDA has consistently provided pregnant women
with adequate relief. Pregnant women often lose suits under the PDA because
courts require them to prove discrimination because of sex by identifying a similarly situated person (a "comparator"). 7 Frequently, no such person exists; even
when one does, courts often reject the proffered "comparator" as insufficiently
similar to the plaintiff unless the comparator is a "near twin" of the plaintiff."
The ADA, meanwhile, had been interpreted so narrowly that pregnancy-related conditions were almost never deemed to be "disabilities." Pregnancy-related conditions were excluded for a variety of reasons. First, because pregnancyrelated impairments are almost always temporary in duration, courts held that
they were not covered disabilities.'9 Second, courts interpreted the ADA's definition of "disability" in an extremely narrow manner.2 o Third, pregnancy was
deemed a "normal" physiological event and thus not a disability."' Collectively,
the result was to prevent women from ever reaching the question of whether an
accommodation was required.
Gender Bias and Pregnancy Discrimination

A.

Although the presence of women in the workplace is no longer unusual, biased views of working mothers and pregnant women persist. Such "maternalwall" bias includes both descriptive bias, which reflects assumptions about how
mothers will behave," and prescriptive bias, which reflects a belief that pregnant

17.

See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (sth Cir. 1998) (rejecting plain-

tiff's claim on the grounds that employees injured on the job are not similarly situated to pregnant employees); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7 th Cir.
1994) (ruling against plaintiff where she failed to identify a similarly situated male
comparator).
18.

See Charles A. Sullivan, PlausiblyPleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1661 (2011); see also Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305,
306 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that "men are physiologically incapable of pumping
breast milk, so plaintiff cannot show that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated men").

19.

See, e.g., Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (finding pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA because it is too short in

duration).
20.

See Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 331,

334

(2010).

C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (1996) (" [C]onditions, such as pregnancy, that are not
the result of a physiological disorder are not impairments.").

21.

29

22.

See Monica Biernat, Faye J. Crosby &Joan C. Williams, The Maternal Wall: Research
and PolicyPerspectives on DiscriminationAgainst Mothers, 60 J.Soc. ISSUES 675, 679
(2004).
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women and mothers do not belong in the workplace at all. 3 Social science studies
show that motherhood triggers strong negative competence and commitment assumptions. The leading study found that mothers were seventy-nine percent less
likely to be hired, were only half as likely to be promoted, were offered an average
of $n,ooo less in salary, and were held to higher performance and punctuality

standards than identical women without children." Other studies have documented discrimination against pregnant women specifically. 5 As a result, women
who seek accommodations for a condition arising out of pregnancy frequently
meet with hostility fueled by gender stereotyping. Often this hostility is driven by
the conviction that it is not fair to require employers to hire pregnant women
because to do so entails special or preferential treatment, a contention commonplace in ADA case law prior to the ADAAA."
If uninterrupted, this sentiment will continue to impede courts' ability to
decide pregnancy accommodation cases free of maternal-wall bias. Courts' intuition that pregnant women are asking for "special treatment" reflects the schema
of an ideal worker who starts to work in early adulthood and works full time for
forty continuous years, needing no accommodations for pregnancy or childbirth." These characteristics describe a population consisting almost exclusively
of men.

23.

For a review of studies on bias triggered by pregnancy and maternity, see Stephen
Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1369-72 (20o8). Other related studies include Stephen Benard &

Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood Penalty,
GENDER& SOC'Y 616

(2010),

24

which attributed the motherhood penalty in part to the

perception that mothers are less committed and competent than other workers;
and Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Motherhood: A PotentialSource of
Bias in Employment Decisions, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 189 (2008), which found that

mothers were perceived as less competent.
24.

Shelley J.Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood
Penalty?, 112 AM. J. Soc. 1297, 1316

25.

(2007).

Benard, Paik & Correll,supra note 23, at 1369-72 (summarizing studies concluding

that pregnant women were less likely to be hired, given lower performance ratings,
and found to be poorer managers than otherwise identical nonpregnant counterparts).
26.

See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v.
Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2006); Urbano v. Cont'1 Airlines, Inc.,
138 F.3d 204, 2o6 (5th Cir. 1998); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 08-2586,
WL 665321 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011), afi'd, 707 F-3d 437 ( 4 th Cir. 2013); AndrewsFilas v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., No. 06-6026, 2006 WL 3743709, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 19, 20o6).
2011

27.

See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000).

103

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

32:97

2013

Yet men too have accommodation needs that are particular to their sex, such
as accommodations needed due to prostate and testicular cancer. These accommodations are not viewed as "special treatment" by employers. Nor do employers
propose to charge men higher insurance rates due to a higher incidence of drunk
driving and smoking among men. 8 If these costs, which are particular to men,
are not seen as affording special treatment to men-why, then, is accommodation of pregnancy seen as giving special treatment to women? The reason is simple. The costs associated uniquely with men are seen as ordinary costs of doing
business-facts of life an employer copes with as the part of hiring a workforce.
Costs uniquely associated with women are, in sharp contrast, considered something extra that employers should not have to shoulder. 9
Pregnant women who need workplace accommodations are not demanding
"special treatment." Rather, they are simply demanding what men already have:
the right to accommodations for the kinds of physical challenges that, Congress
has decided, an employer can be expected to cope with as a cost of hiring a workforce.
B.

Statutory Protectionsfor PregnantWomen

The two primary federal laws that allow for workplace accommodations to
women with pregnancy-related impairments are the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 30 The power of these statutes to provide pregnant women with accommodations has been vastly expanded by the
ADAAA.

28.

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vital Signs: Alchohol-Impaired Driving
Among Adults-United States, 2oo, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1351,
1351 (2011); Adult CigaretteSmoking in the UnitedStates: CurrentEstimate, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 5, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco
/data-statistics/fact sheets/adult data/cig.smoking/; cf City of Los Angeles v.
Manhart, 345 U.S.702 (1978) (holding that employers cannot charge women higher
pension contributions than men, on the grounds that they cost more because they
live longer).

29.

See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994); Richard A. Posner,
Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191.

30.

Another relevant federal statute is the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
which qualifying employees can use to take up to 12 weeks of job-guaranteed, unpaid leave for the birth of a child or to address a "serious health condition," among
other things. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2653 (2012). The statute only applies to workers who
have worked for their employer for at least one year and at least 1,250 hours, and
the employer must have at least 5o employees within a 75-mile radius. Id. The statute allows only for leave, which is always unpaid and which may be involuntary
(i.e., an employer may obligate a pregnant woman to use her FMLA leave rather
than accommodate her at work). Accordingly, it is often of little help to pregnant

women needing accommodations, and may in fact result in women losing their
jobs because they are forced to take leave early in their pregnancies and use up their
104
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i.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act

The PDA was enacted in 1978 to make clear that pregnancy discrimination is
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
However, the language of the PDA does not merely prohibit discrimination because of pregnancy. It also mandates that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inabilityto work."" While not specifically requiring the accommodation of pregnancy-related conditions, the plain statutory language thus requires that employers place pregnant women with impairments on the same footing as nonpregnant
workers with similar impairments." That is, an employer must make an accommodation for pregnant employees if the employer has or would have done so for
any of its nonpregnant employees.
2.

The Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA, passed in 1990, prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability." 4 Such discrimination is defined to include "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee," unless making accommodations would result in "undue hardship" to
the employer." To be entitled to accommodation under the ADA, a worker must
demonstrate that she has a disability; that she can perform the essential functions
of the job with a reasonable accommodation; and that the employer has been

12

weeks before their child is even born. For more on this topic, see Cox, supranote

n1, at 454-59-

31.

Pub. L. 95-555,

92

Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k)

(2012)).

Title

VII provides that employers may not "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's [sex]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000C-2(a)(1) (2012).
32.

Id. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added).

33.

Indeed, the PDA was enacted specifically in order to overturn a Supreme Court
ruling that it was not sex discrimination to exclude pregnancy from a private employer's temporary disability policy. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 989-98.

34.

42 U.S.C.

35.

Id. § 12112(b)(5) (A).

36.

Id.

§ 12112(a).
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given notice of the need for accommodation.37 In order to satisfy the "disability"
requirement, the worker must show that her condition qualifies as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities."3
C. Obstacles to PregnancyAccommodation Under the PDA
A major obstacle to accommodation under the PDA is that some circuits require plaintiffs to produce comparator evidence-that is, evidence that similarly
situated employees who are not pregnant were treated more advantageously.39
When courts assess whether comparators are "similar in their ability or inability
to work," 40 they often have excluded many coworkers who would seem to fit this
description well.41 Similarly, courts often fail to acknowledge that, while "Title
VII generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that [a comparator] be similarly situated in all respects[,] . . . the PDA requires only that the [comparator]

be similar in his or her 'ability or inability to work."' 4 Many courts have conflated the PDA's requirement with Title VII's "similarly situated" comparator
standards, requiring, for instance, that a pregnant woman find a comparator to
be comparable in all respects.43 Thus, in Tysinger v. Police Department of Zanesville, the court found that the plaintiff could not use as comparators two male

37.

See Mzyk v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 Fed. App'x. 13, 16 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (unpublished); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 (7 th Cir.
2005); Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2004);
Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F-3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995).

38.

42 U.S.C. §

39.

Some courts insist that the plaintiff produce comparators. See, e.g., Arizanovska v.

12102(1)

(A).

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 90-1404, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107405 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
22, 2011); Barton v. G.E.C., Inc., No. 09-1123, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26863 (M.D. La.
Mar. 16, 2011). A 2002 study found that six circuits generally hold that a plaintiff's

failure to produce a comparator is fatal to a prima facie case. Ernest F. Lidge III,

The Courts' Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination
Law, 67 Mo. L. REV. 831, 849 (2002). The Center for WorkLife Law has long argued

that no comparator is necessary, an approach that has been adopted in some courts
and in the EEOC'S 2007 Enforcement Guidance. See Joan C. Williams, Dir., Ctr. for
WorkLife

Law,

Written

Testimony

Before

the

EEOC

(Feb.

15,

2012),

http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/williams.cfm.
40.

See Widiss, supra note 7, at

41.

See Suzanne Goldberg, Discriminationby Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011);

1015-17.

Charles A.Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discriminationby Comparators, 6o ALA. L. REV. 191, 193 n.1 (2009).

42.

Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon,

quotation marks omitted).

43.
106

See id.

1oo

F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal
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police officers who, although disabled, had not asked for a workplace accommodation." "[E]ven though the temporarily disabled officers admitted that they
could not fully perform their jobs, the fact that they did not request a temporary
reassignment sufficiently distinguished their situation from that of the pregnant
officer/plaintiff to defeat her pregnancy discrimination claim."45
Another challenge for plaintiffs making a claim under the PDA is the fact
that courts frequently determine whether a comparator is similar in her ability or
inability to work by looking to the reason for the underlying impairment. As a
result, there is a split in the circuits as to whether a policy precluding workplace
accommodations for any off-the-job "injury"-including pregnancy-is consistent with the PDA.46 Some courts reason that a policy distinguishing between
on-the-job and off-the-job injuries is "pregnancy blind" and, thus, not discriminatory.47 Other courts and commentators have noted that this approach is inconsistent with the plain text of the PDA,48 which requires simply that the proffered
comparator be similar in his or her ability or inability to work.4 9

44.

463 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2006).

45.

Thomas H. Barnard &Adrienne L. Rapp, PregnantEmployees, Working Mothers and
the Workplace-Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are Today, 22 J.L. &
HEALTH 197, 213 (2009).

46.

Compare Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d

204

(5th Cir. 1998) (finding that

an employer did not violate the PDA by granting light duty assignments only to
employees injured on the job), with Ensley-Gaines, oo F.3d 1220 (finding that a
pregnant employee was similarly situated to limited-duty employees who were in-

jured on the job).
47.

See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446 (4 th Cir. 2013); Serednyj v.
Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011); Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206.

48.

See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 fl7 (loth Cir.
2000) ("If a plaintiff is compared only to nonpregnant employees injured off the
job, her case would be 'short circuited' at the prima facie stage . . . ."); EnsleyGaines, oo F.3d at 1226 ("While Title VII generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that the employee who received more favorable treatment be similarly situated 'in all respects,' the PDA requires only that the employee be similar in his or
her 'ability or inability to work."' (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577,
583 (6th Cir. 1992)); Germain v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 07-CV-2523, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45434 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009); Sumner v. Wayne Cnty., 94 F. Supp. 2d 822,
826 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("The proper focus under the comparison prong is whether

the employees are similar in their ability or inability to work, regardless of the
source of the injury or illness."). But see Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637,
641 n.1 (6th Cir. 20o6) (granting summary judgment for employer and distinguishing Ensley-Gaines).
49.

See Widiss, supra note 7, at 1022 ("[The PDA] requires that employers' treatment
of pregnant employees be compared to their treatment of all employees 'similar in
their ability to work or not work,' not all employees similar in the cause of their
ability to work or not work."); see also Emily Martin, Vice President and Gen.
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It is important to recognize that comparator evidence is only one way of
proving a PDA case. Title VII requires plaintiffs to prove that an adverse employment action is because of sex; the PDA requires plaintiffs to prove that they were
not treated "the same" as others with a "similar ability or inability to work.""o
Nothing in the language of the PDA requires limiting probative evidence to comparator evidence. Appropriately, many courts allow plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment even if they have not identified comparators." A variety of methods
permit proof of disparate treatment without comparators, including evidence
that the adverse action was based on sex stereotyping" or occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (such as temporal proximity53 or remarks indicating pregnancy-related animus 54 ). In addition, a plaintiff
can be her own comparator by showing that she was treated one way when not
pregnant and another way after announcing her pregnancy.55 Nonetheless, when
courts adhere (as they often have) to the "near-twin" comparator requirement,
pregnant women needing accommodations frequently found themselves out of
luck. 6
D. Obstacles to PregnancyAccommodation Under the Pre-Amendment ADA
Under the pre-amendment ADA, accommodations were occasionally avail-

able to pregnant women suffering very serious complications. 57 For the most part,
however, pregnancy-related conditions were deemed insufficient to qualify as

Counsel, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., Written Testimony Before the EEOC (February
15, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/martin.cfm; Joanna L. Grossman &Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the PregnancyAccommodation Act's Capacity-BasedModel, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 36 (2009).
50.
5i.

Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe(k), 20ooe-2(a) (2012).

This can happen, for example, in cases where the adverse action violates company
policy. See Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1255 (ith Cir. 2012).
See generally CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, JOAN C. WILLIAMS & GARY E. PHELAN,
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION ch. 2 (forthcoming 2014) (on file with authors) (discussing this phenomenon).

supra note 5i, ch.

52.

See CALVERT, WILLIAMS

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

See Widiss, supra note 7, at 1016 ("As a practical matter ... courts often require
comparators and will dismiss a case or grant summary judgment if a plaintiff lacks
them.").

57.

See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp.
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& PHELAN

2.

125, 130 (D. Conn. 1997) (determining that premature labor could qualify as an impairment under the preamendment ADA).
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disabilities. Courts found such conditions fell short of a covered disability for
three primary reasons: (1) pregnancy and pregnancy-related conditions were
considered too short in duration to qualify as impairments under the pre-amendment ADA; (2) the analysis of whether an impairment "substantially limited" a
"major life activity" was given an overly restrictive interpretation which excluded
pregnancy and pregnancy-related conditions; and (3) conditions related to a
"normal pregnancy" were eliminated from consideration because they were not
considered impairmentsi 8
i.

The Duration Requirement

Prior to the ADAAA, many courts held that pregnancy-related impairments
that subsided shortly after the termination of pregnancy and left no lasting harm
were not substantially limiting. 9 This reasoning was premised on the preADAAA, judicially constructed standard that an impairment is only disabling
when its impact is "permanent or long term.""o In support of this view, courts
often quoted a portion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
then-current interpretive guidance, which stated that "temporary, non-chronic
impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact,
are usually not disabilities."'
2.

Restrictive Interpretation of "Major Life Activity" and "Substantially Limits"

Another obstacle to establishing disability based on a pregnancy-related condition was the severe set of requirements courts applied for a condition to qualify
as "substantially limiting" a "major life activity" under the pre-amendment ADA.
Pre-ADAAA courts limited "major life activities" to activities "of central importance to most people's daily lives."" Episodic or intermittent conditions were
not typically considered impairments because they did not consistently interfere

58.
59.

Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 974, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002).
See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2011); Payne
v. Student Assistance Comm., No. 07-981, 2009 WL 1468610, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May
22, 2009); Leahr v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., No. 96 C 1388, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS

10601,

at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 17,

1997).

60.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).

61.

29

62.

Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 ("We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance
to most people's daily lives.").

C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. (1991); see, e.g., McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 95
(3d Cir. 1995).
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with major life activities." Similarly, courts held that to be substantially limiting,
a condition must "prevent[] or severely restrict[]" accomplishment of a major
life activity.6 4 Under these interpretations, serious limitations frequently caused
by pregnancy-related conditions were deemed not substantially limiting. 65
3.

The "Normal-Pregnancy" Doctrine

EEOC regulations accompanying both the pre-amendment and amended
ADA state that pregnancy is not per se a disability because it is considered a physiological condition, rather than a "disorder.""6 Citing this language, pre-ADAAA
courts frequently held that pregnancy-related conditions were never covered by
the ADA except in "extremely rare" cases."' Courts also commonly asserted that
no condition related to pregnancy could ever constitute an impairment. Under
this interpretation, a pregnant woman seeking ADA protection had to prove that
her limitations stemmed from a medical condition that predated her pregnancy
and was exacerbated by it.68
Taken together, these holdings sent the message that pregnancy contaminates a limitation that otherwise would qualify as a disability-a contention traditionally called the "normal-pregnancy doctrine." This doctrine is more aptly

63.

See, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that a
plaintiff with epilepsy was not substantially limited in a major life activity by "relatively infrequent" seizures); Zirpei v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., ii F. 3 d 80, 81 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff suffering from intermittent panic attacks was not
substantially limited in a major life activity).

64.

Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.

65.

See Zahurance v. Valley Packaging Indus., Inc., 397 Fed. App'x. 246, 248 (7 th Cir.
2010) (holding that a twenty-pound lifting restriction is not substantially limiting);
Mays v. Principi, 3o F.3d 866, 869 (7 th Cir. 2002) (expressing doubt as to whether
a ten-pound lifting restriction is substantially limiting); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 297 F-3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (determining a pharmacist with diabetes was not
covered by the ADA, in part because of mitigating measures such as diet and insulin
injections); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5 th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that the inability to perform "heavy lifting" does not substantially limit ability
to lift); Kennebrew v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. oi CIV 1654, 2002 WL 265120, at *18
n.32 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2002) (finding no evidence that a plaintiff's gestational diabetes "was substantial enough to constitute a disability for ADA purposes"). But see
Kapche v. Holder, 677 F.3d 454 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (interpreting pre-ADAAA law to
support a verdict for the plaintiff relying on evidence that diabetes substantially
limited the major life activity of eating).

66.

29

67.

See, e.g., Conley v. United Parcel Serv., 88 F. Supp.

68.

See, e.g., Patterson ex rel.Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp.
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C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (1996) ("[Clonditions, such as pregnancy, that are not
the result of a physiological disorder are not impairments.").
2d 16

(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
274

(N.D. Ill.

1995).
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called the "pregnancy-contamination doctrine." Under the pregnancy-contamination doctrine, an impairment that would entitle the plaintiff to an ADA accommodation if it stemmed from any condition other than pregnancy would not
entitle the same plaintiff to the same accommodation if the symptoms stemmed
from pregnancy. This logic has never been applied to any physiological process
other than pregnancy. Aging is a good example since it is a normal physiological
process that commonly produces impairments. For example, more than forty
percent of men over the age of sixty-five have overactive bladders. 9 But no court
we are aware of has ever proposed to exclude impairments that stem from aging
on the grounds that aging is a normal physiological process.
Thus, one court held that a plaintiff who suffered from "periodic nausea,
vomiting, dizziness, severe headaches, and fatigue" was not protected by the ADA
due to the "common knowledge that all of these symptoms, at some degree of
severity, are part and parcel of a normal pregnancy." 70 Another court held that a
plaintiff who experienced morning sickness, stress, nausea, back pain, swelling,
and headaches was not impaired under the ADA because "[a]ll of the physiological conditions and changes related to a pregnancy also are not impairments unless they exceed normal ranges or are attributable to some disorder."7' And yet
another court found that ovarian cysts accompanying a pregnancy did not constitute an impairment because "pregnancy and related medical conditions do
not, absent unusual circumstances, constitute a 'physical impairment' under the
ADA."7 As a result of these strict limitations, few plaintiffs won pre-amendment
ADA claims.
These sharp limitations on ADA coverage were part of the courts' strained
interpretation of the Act's purpose-an interpretation of the intent of Congress
that the ADAAA was designed to correct. By 2006, defendants were winning
ninety-seven percent of all ADA cases resolved in court, most of which turned on
whether the plaintiff (whether pregnant or not) was entitled to protected status.73
The passage of the ADAAA changed the statutory framework in important ways
to give effect to the underlying goals of the ADA.

69.

See Claus G. Roehrborn &John D. McConnell, Etiology, Pathophysiology,Epidemiology and Natural History of Benign ProstaticHyperplasia,in CAMPBELL'S UROLOGY
1297

(Patrick C. Walsh et al., eds.,

2002).

70.

Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp.,
F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2003).

71.

Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 1996).
Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1o9, 119 (D.N.H. 1995).

72.

73.

209

F. Supp.

2d 970, 976

(S.D. Iowa

2002),

affd,

340

Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalenceand Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination
Claims in the FederalCourts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 303, 305
(2005).

111

YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW

II.

32:97

THE ADAAA AND A

NEW

2013

ENTITLEMENT TO PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION

The 2008 amendments to the ADA brought new possibilities to women seeking accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions in the workplace. The
clear language of the statute and its accompanying EEOC regulations unambiguously encompass pregnancy-related conditions. Moreover, with Congress' restoration of the intent of the original ADA to provide coverage that is inclusive,
rather than exclusive, with respect to employees who are entitled to protection
under the Act, the accommodation rights of pregnant women experiencing comparable impairments are also expanded.
A.

Overview of the ADAAA

When the original ADA was enacted in 1990, it was intended to provide
equality for individuals with disabilities in the workplace. In subsequent years, a
series of Supreme Court decisions 74 so narrowed the scope of protection that a
bipartisan coalition in Congress determined it was necessary to amend the statute." The result was the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act
(ADAAA), which took effect on January 1, 2009.76 The goal of the ADAAA was to
"restore the proper balance and application of the ADA by clarifying and broadening the definition of disability, and to increase eligibility for the protections of
the ADA.""7 The term "disability" was now to "be construed in favor of broad
coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms of this chapter."78 Congress hoped that this would provide a level of
coverage that was "generous and inclusive"79 in order to "afford people with disabilities the freedom to participate in our community, free from discrimination
and its segregating effects.""o

74.

75.

See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (creating arduous standards for the terms "substantially limits" and "major life activities");
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (holding that mitigating
measures could be taken into account in determining whether an individual is disabled).
See Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2o6, H.R. 6258, 1o9th Cong.
(2006).

§ 12101

(2012).

76.

42 U.S.C.

77.

154 CONG. REC. S884o

78.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).

79.

154 CONG.

REC. H8288 (daily ed. Sept.

80.

154 CONG.

REC. H8294 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (joint statement of Reps. Hoyer and

Sensenbrenner).
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(daily ed. Sept. 16,
17,

20o8) (statement of the managers).

20o8) (statement of Rep. Miller).
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Both the statute and the ensuing EEOC regulations (issued in early 2011)
make clear that courts should not focus on the issue of whether a plaintiffs impairment was sufficiently limiting to constitute an eligible disability."' One express purpose of the ADAAA is:
[T]o convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and ...
that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability
under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis."
The EEOC similarly stated that "[t]he primary object of attention in cases
brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with
their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the definition of disability."8 3The EEOC regulations also state, "the
Amendments Act and the amended regulations make plain that the emphasis in
ADA cases now should be squarely on the merits and not on the initial coverage
question."4 Accordingly, the key issue in ADA cases-in pregnancy contexts as
in every other context-is whether an employer can accommodate a disabled
worker without undue hardship.
The ADAAA sought to accomplish its goal of expanding coverage through
specific changes to the statute's language. These revisions included clarifying and
expanding the definitions of "substantially limits" and "major life activities," as
well as easing the duration requirement. Thus, as a result of the ADAAA, many
conditions that would not have been covered under the pre-amendment ADA
are now considered disabilities.5 When one of the newly covered conditions
arises in connection with a pregnancy, the pregnant woman who experiences the
condition qualifies for protection under the ADA. This is the core of the impairment theory: Even though the statute is not pregnancy-specific, it broadens the
base of conditions for which pregnant women can receive protection and accommodation. Under the comparator theory, the additional protections of the
ADAAA are translated into additional protections under the PDA. This is true
because the ADAAA expands the pool of comparators to whom a pregnant
woman may point when seeking to use comparators as evidence of discrimination under the PDA.

C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4)

81.

ADA Amendments Act § 2, 122 Stat.

82.

83.

ADA Amendments Act § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) app.

84.

ID.

85.

See, e.g., Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2012)
(holding that a worker suffering from asthma and high blood pressure did not have
a disability); Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter LLP, No. 10-24, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133343,
at *23 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (finding that, although obesity was not a disability
before the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, it may be under the current regime).

AT

3554

(20o8); 29

(2011).

§ 163 o.2(j)(1)(iii).
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The Impairment Theory

The impairment theory holds that, just as the amended ADA now protects
vast numbers of workers whose conditions would not have qualified as disabilities prior to the passage of the ADAAA, it also protects women affected by identical conditions that happen to be caused by pregnancy. Thus, plaintiffs experiencing a broad range of pregnancy-related conditions will be able to establish a
right to accommodation since pregnancies can substantially limit the major bodily functions listed in the statute, including the digestive, bladder, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.8 6 The amendments to
the ADA address the four key obstacles pregnant women faced when bringing
claims under the pre-amendment statute: duration, severity, undue limitations
on the meaning of "major life activity," and the pregnancy-contamination doctrine.
i.

Rejection of the Duration Requirement

The regulations accompanying the ADAAA eliminated the duration requirement from the definition of "disability."17 No longer are impairments that last
only a short time deemed ineligible to be considered a disability. The EEOC regulations now expressly state that "[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting."" This means
that a condition likely to subside at or before the end of the pregnancy can be
considered a disability. However, the interpretive guidance to the regulations
nonetheless cautions that "[t]he duration of an impairment is one factor that is
relevant in determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. Impairments that last only for a short period of time are typically not
covered, although they may be covered if sufficiently severe."'9 The phrase "a
short period of time" is not expressly defined, but, when viewed in conjunction
with the regulations' language recognizing that conditions lasting less than six
months may be disabilities, it seems that it must be a very short period indeed.
Furthermore, the guidance makes clear that even very short-term conditions may
be impairments if they are sufficiently severe. For example, this means that a

86.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2012);

87.

29 C.F.R.

88.

29

§ 163 0.2(j)(1)(ix)

see 29 C.F.R. §

163 0.2(i)(1)(ii) (2013).

app.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102.

C.F.R. § 163 0.2(j)(1)(ix). For instance, "if an individual has a back impairment

that results in a twenty-pound lifting restriction that lasts for several months, he is
substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting, and therefore covered under
the first prong of the definition of disability." Id. § 163 0.2(j)(1)(ix) app.
89.

114

Id. § 163 o.2(j)(1)(ix) app.

A SIP OF COOL WATER

woman experiencing debilitating nausea for just a few weeks (or even less) may
be found to have an impairment.
2.

Easing of the "Substantially Limits" Standard

In enacting the ADAAA, Congress noted that the term "substantially limits"
had been narrowly interpreted by the courts. The findings and purposes located
in the introductory note of the ADAAA state that the Supreme Court has "interpreted the term 'substantially limits' to require a greater degree of limitation than
was intended by Congress" and that the EEOC's interpretation of "substantially
limits" to mean "significantly restricts" created too high a burden.9 o In order to
effect the intent of the ADA, the ADAAA states "that whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity" should not "be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled" or to mean "prevents or
severely restricts."9'
The EEOC regulations of the amended ADA reinforce the reduced thresh92
old. First, they expressly recognize that the ADAAA's broadened definitions encompass pregnancy-related impairments. Indeed, the regulations state that "a
pregnancy-related impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is a
disability under the first prong of the definition."93 Guidance issued by the EEOC
cites gestational diabetes and preeclampsia as examples of pregnancy-related impairments that may be considered disabilities under the law.9 4 Next, the regulations note that " [t] he term 'substantially limits' shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the
ADA. 'Substantially limits' is not meant to be a demanding standard." 5 Moreover, the regulations state that the proper construction of "substantially limits"
will "require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for

90.

ADA Amendments Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54
(citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).

91.

ADA Amendments Act § 2(b),

92.

122 Stat. at 3554.
Note that these regulations should be granted significant Chevron deference, given
that the ADAAA explicitly grants the agency the authority to interpret the law. 42
U.S.C. § 12117 (2006) (granting EEOC interpretive authority); see Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (holding that
agency regulations interpreting ambiguous statutory language are due judicial deference).

C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (emphasis added).

93.

29

94.

Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S.

EQUAL

EMP.

OPPORTUNITY

http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/pregnancy.cfm (last visited June 20,
95.

29 C.F.R.

COMMISSION,
2013).

§ 1630.2(j)(1) (2011).
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'substantially limits' applied prior to the ADAAA." 96 Finally, the regulations affirm that "[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict,
the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered
substantially limiting." 7 Thus, as a result of both revisions to the statutory language and the new EEOC regulations, many more individuals are considered
"substantially limited" under the amended ADA.
The ADAAA further provides that "[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,"9' allowing treatable impairments to qualify as disabilities. Thus, it would seem that a plaintiff who successfully controls her gestational diabetes but requires modifications to her work
schedule to take meals and check her blood sugar has a protected disability,
although she would not have under the pre-amendment ADA. And any condition that, left unmitigated, would result in miscarriage should be a disability on
the grounds that it substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction.
Courts should no longer penalize pregnant plaintiffs for the countless methods
they use to work through pregnancy-related conditions. The ability to work
through the symptoms of a condition is not an indication that the condition isn't
substantially limiting.
The statute also requires that courts evaluate episodic impairments in their
active states. The amended ADA states that "[a]n impairment that is episodic or
in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when
active."99 For example, in the case where pregnancy has exacerbated hypertension
or a vasovagal response resulting in occasional fainting episodes, courts should
consider the impact of the condition during an episode.'

96.

Id.

97.
98.

Id.
§ 12102(4)(E)(i) (2012); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) ("The determination
of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made
without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.").
42 U.S.C.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(Vii) (2013) ("An impairment
that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major
life activity when active.").
ioo. Where denying an accommodation would likely result in an employee being unable
to perform the essential functions of the job, the employer needs to provide the
requested accommodation absent undue hardship. See, e.g., Randolph v. Rodgers,

99.

170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999); Buckingham v. U.S. Postal Serv., 998 F.2d 735, 743
(9th Cir. 1993).
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3.

Expanding the "Major Life Activity" Standard

In addition to easing the "substantially limits" standard, the ADAAA clarified the definition of the "major life activities." Before the ADA was amended,
the term "major life activities" was interpreted by courts to refer to "those activities that are of central importance to daily life.""o' The ADAAA replaced that interpretation with a non-exhaustive list of activities, which now includes, among
other activities, "performing manual tasks... sleeping, eating, walking, standing,
lifting, bending,... breathing,. . . concentrating, thinking,. . . and working."lO2
The definition also now includes the operation of a "major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth,
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine,
and reproductive functions.""o3
As a result of this new definition, many pregnancy-related impairments fall
under the ADA because they interfere with the operation of major bodily functions or with other major life activities.o 4 For example, lumbar lordosis, the swaybacked posture caused by a growing belly and the fact that pregnancy hormones
loosen up the joints, can cause back pain that interferes with lifting, bending, and
standing. Similarly, pregnancy-related syncope, which is dizziness or fainting resulting from increased blood flow to the uterus and fetus, interferes with a
woman's ability to deal with heat, stress, or exertion. These are just two examples
of conditions that are now covered by the ADA (and that just happen to result
from pregnancy).o 5 More examples are detailed in the Appendix.

io.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc.. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197

102.

42 U.S.C.

§

12102(2)

(A); see

29

C.F.R. §

(2002).

1630.2(i) (1)(i).

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii).
104. At a minimum, even pregnant women who fail to meet the definition of "disabled"
under the ADA may have a viable ADA retaliation claim if they request an accommodation and believe their employers later retaliated against them for doing so.
When an individual believes, in good faith, that she is entitled to an accommodation under the ADA, she is protected by the ADA's anti-retaliation provision even
if the impairment in question does not rise to the level of a disability under the

103.

ADA. See, e.g., Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 20o6); Krouse v.
Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1997).

105.

The Appendix describes more of the pregnancy-related disabilities women can experience. It is not an exhaustive list of such disabilities and it is important for employees, employers and litigators to consult with medical experts when determining
whether an employee has a qualifying disability which requires accommodation absent undue hardship.
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The Pregnancy-Contamination Doctrine Runs Contrary to the
ADAAA's Mandate of Broad Coverage

In amending the ADA, Congress made explicit its intention to eliminate hurdles that had created a "demanding standard to qualify as disabled."o' The pregnancy-contamination doctrine is precisely such a hurdle, and is inconsistent with
the clear statutory language requiring that the definition of disability "be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals."o 7 The mandate that the postamendment ADA's coverage be "broad," "inclusive," and "generous"o' means
that courts now should primarily focus not on whether a woman's pregnancyrelated condition qualifies as a disability, but rather on whether her employer has
engaged in an interactive process and can accommodate her without undue hardship.
Indeed, to continue to accept the pregnancy-contamination doctrine following the amendments to the ADA would create a far more demanding standard
for pregnant women than for any other group of workers. For instance, carpal
tunnel syndrome arises both in the general population and (far more frequently)' 9 in pregnant women. Under the pregnancy-contamination doctrine, a
nonpregnant worker with carpal tunnel syndrome would be covered by the ADA,
but a pregnant worker with precisely the same medical condition would not be
covered if her carpal tunnel syndrome arose as a result of pregnancy. Under such
logic, pregnancy contaminates an otherwise covered disability, rendering that
condition unprotected under the ADA.
The language and purpose of the ADAAA and its accompanying EEOC regulations make clear that a woman cannot be denied accommodations at work
purely because her impairment stems from pregnancy (even a supposed "normal
pregnancy"), because it is short-term, or because it does not qualify as an impairment in the first place on the grounds that it is not "substantially limiting." The
amended ADA is broader and more encompassing. It emphasizes the particular
condition, and not the cause of that condition, and thus plainly covers pregnancy-related conditions as well as numerous non-pregnancy-related conditions

lo6.

ADA Amendments Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553
(2008) ("[C]ourts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a
range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities.").

107.

See 42

i08.

154 CONG. REC. H8289 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 20o8) (statement of Rep. Nadler); 154
CONG. REC. H8288 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Miller).

109.

While up to sixty-two percent of pregnant women develop carpal tunnel syndrome
due to swelling and fluid retention caused by pregnancy, only three percent of the
general population suffers from the condition. See Robert H. Ablove & Tova S.
Ablove, Prevalenceof CarpalTunnel Syndrome in PregnantWomen, 108 WISC. MED.

U.S.C. § 12102(4)

J. 194, 194
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that were previously excluded. In addition to these statutory changes, which expand protection for pregnant women under the ADA, the ADAAA also allows for
greater access under the PDA by creating a larger class of nonpregnant workers
who are entitled to accommodations. This is addressed by our "comparator theory" in the following section.
C. The ComparatorTheory
As observed by Professors Jeannette Cox and Deborah A. Widiss,"o the
ADAAA improves access to accommodations not just directly but also indirectly,
by way of the PDA. Where an employer provides help with lifting for an employee
limited by a cardiac condition, for example, the employer must also provide help
with lifting for a pregnant employee whose healthcare provider has limited the
amount of weight she should lift. This stems from the PDA's mandate that
"women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.""'
Employees who believe they are being discriminated against based on their
pregnancies may bring disparate-treatment claims under the PDA. A common
method of establishing a disparity in treatment using indirect evidence"' is to use
comparators. In such situations," 3 the fact that the ADAAA extends accommodations to more employees with disabilities expands the range of comparators
available to pregnant workers. Under the comparator theory, a pregnant woman
might well gain accommodation rights for conditions that are not "impairments"
under the ADA.

no.
il.

See Cox, supra note ii, at 466-68; Widiss, supra note 7, at 1004-10, 1018-35.
42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2013) (emphasis added).

112.

A PDA plaintiff may prove discrimination through either direct or indirect evi-

dence. Direct evidence is "evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact
without inference or presumption." Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d
1249, 1255 (nth Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Such
evidence would include, for instance, an employer's blatant discriminatory remarks. Indirect evidence is circumstantial, and is typically provided via the burdenshifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
and Texas Departmentof Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Logically, where there is direct evidence of discrimination, presenting indirect evidence-and, thus, comparators-is not necessary.

113.

To assert a prima facie right to accommodation using the commonly applied
McDonnell Douglas test, a woman must show that her employer is aware that she is
pregnant or "affected by pregnancy," has been performing her job satisfactorily, has
been subject to an adverse employment action, and that she was treated differently
from other similarly situated employees. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 637 F.3d
729, 736 (7th Cir. 2011).
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The use of such comparators from the plaintiffs workplace is standard and
embodies what we call the "de facto comparator theory." However, this should
not be the only way that plaintiffs may obtain accommodations under the PDA.
Instead, under what we call the "de jure comparator theory," pregnant plaintiffs
should have access to accommodations if they can prove that a nonpregnant
worker with similar limitations would be entitled to reasonable accommodations
under the ADA or other disability-accommodation laws, were he or she to exist
in the workplace at that time.
i.

The Prospective Impact of the ADAAA on PDA Claims: The "De
Facto Comparator Theory"

The de facto comparator theory holds that, where a plaintiff chooses to prove
her case through the use of comparators within her own workplace, the ADAAA's
shift towards accommodation of a broader range of workers, including those who
are temporarily disabled, dramatically expands the pool of potential comparators.
As discussed above, the ADAAA makes accommodation a more widespread
practice. Early outcomes of cases proceeding under the amended ADA suggest
that accommodations are now available for a range of conditions that can cause
limitations similar to those experienced by pregnant women.114 Some of these
conditions cause the same symptoms suffered by nonpregnant workers as a result
of a different disease. The sardonic comment that the PDA entitles pregnant
women to be treated just as badly as everyone else 15 loses some of its sting as the
standard of treatment for everyone else improves.
One potential impact of the ADAAA on the PDA involves employer policies
that limit accommodations to workers who were injured on the job. Such policies

114.

See, e.g., Thomas v. Bala Nursing & Ret. Ctr., No. 11-5771, 2012 WL 2581057 (E.D. Pa.
July 3, 2012) (allowing a plaintiff suffering from anemia and associated standing,
walking, and sleeping problems to survive summary judgment); Gibbs v. ADS Alliance Data Sys., Inc., No. 10-2421, 2011 WL 3205779 (D. Kan. July 28, 2011) (denying
employer's summary judgment motion on employee's ADA claim stemming from
carpal tunnel syndrome); Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-514, 2011 WL 2713737 (E.D.
Pa. July 13, 2011) (holding that the ADAAA does not mandate strict durational requirements); Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., No. 10-91, 2011 WL 1832952
(E.D. Tex. May 13, 2011) (denying a motion for partial summary judgment on
grounds that renal cancer is capable of being classified as a disability despite plaintiff's remission).

115.

Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Employers can
treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees, even to the point of conditioning the availability of an employment benefit
on an employee's decision to return to work after the end of the medical disability
that pregnancy causes." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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have been regularly used to deny pregnant workers light duty and other accommodations."' Such policies were never enforceable when workers injured off the
job were entitled to accommodation under the ADA."' But because of the highly
constricted scope of the pre-amendment ADA, such situations were rare."' Now
that many more people injured both on and off the job are eligible for ADA accommodation, however, the place of injury is moot for ADA purposes. An employer's ability to offer preferential treatment for on-the-job injuries applies only
to the significantly smaller class of persons who cannot qualify as disabled under
the ADA." 9
One court has suggested that potential comparators are not sufficiently similar if one, but not the other, would be entitled to accommodation under the
ADA. 2 0 In Young v. United Parcel Service, UPS declined to accommodate a pregnant woman's lifting restrictions on the grounds that such accommodations were
available only to employees with "a permanent impairment cognizable under the
ADA."'' 'The Fourth Circuit determined that such a policy did not violate the
PDA because it was "pregnancy-blind," and that to hold otherwise would constitute "preferential treatment" for pregnant women."' Professor Widiss points out
that, if this interpretation were widely accepted, the protection of the PDA would
dwindle to only those cases in which the comparator is not disabled-which, now
that the ADA has been amended to allow more employees to qualify as disabled,
is a very small number of cases.2 3 This rule would eviscerate the PDA. As Widiss

116.

See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013); Reeves
v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 20o6); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (ith Cir. 1999).

117.

Widiss, supra note 7, at 1033.
See id.

18.
119.

However, it is still the case that employers have the right to choose which reasonable
accommodation to offer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. (2013). It is conceivable that courts
would support an employer accommodating on-the-job injuries in one way, and
other injuries in another.

120.

Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 08-2586,

2011

WL 665321 (D. Md. Feb. 14,

20n), affd, 707 F.3d 437 ( 4 th Cir. 2013); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F. 3 d

540, 548 (7 th Cir.

2011).

F.3d at 440.

121.

707

122.

Id. at 448. In Serednyj, a nursing home's modified work policy provided accommodations only to qualified individuals with a disability under the ADA or to employees with work-related injuries. 656 F.3d at 548. The court upheld the policy, but
discussed only the work-related injury requirement. Id. at 548-49.
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See Widiss, supra note

7,

at 1023-25; cf Cox, supra note n1,at 469-72 (contending
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notes, "the fact that the ADA was amended to provide far more robust protections for disabilities generally would have the perverse effect of decreasing the
support for pregnant employees."'"
It is significant, however, that only one court has interpreted the comparator
requirement this way, perhaps because the interpretation is clearly erroneous. As
Professor Widiss explains, the plain language of the PDA's second clause obligates employers to treat pregnant women the same as others "similar in their
ability or inability to work." No mention is made that individuals protected under other statutes should be excluded from the realm of possible comparators for
PDA purposes."' To prevent ADA-accommodated employees from being comparators in a PDA claim would also result in an implied repeal of the PDA, which
is both highly disfavored as a general interpretive principle"' and expressly pro-

hibited by the ADA, which states that no part of that law "shall be construed to
invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law. . . that
provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities
than are afforded by this chapter."" 7 The only sensible interpretation is, as Widiss
puts it, "the natural reading of the PDA's plain text and a reasonable means of
harmonizing two statutes with a common purpose: increasing employment opportunities for employees with health conditions that impact their ability to
work."'
2.

The "De

Jure Comparator Theory"

Professor Widiss discusses an alternative comparator theory in her Article.' 9
She argues that making pregnancy accommodations depend on whether an individual workplace has another employee who has been granted an accommodation makes important civil rights hinge on serendipity. Widiss argues that pregnant plaintiffs should be entitled to accommodations if they can prove that a
hypothetical nonpregnant worker with similar conditions would be entitled to
reasonable accommodations under the ADA or other disability-accommodation
laws. We call this the "de jure comparator theory."

increase of the number of persons entitled to workplace accommodations may inadvertently decrease the number of pregnant women who receive them via the
PDA").
124.

Widiss, supra note 7, at 1025.

125.

Id. at

126.

Widiss, supra note 7, at 1030.

127.

42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2012).

128.

Widiss, supra note 7, at 1031.

129.

Id. at 1033-34.
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Under this theory, a court in a PDA case would be required to imagine a
fictional ADA plaintiff with the same maladies as the pregnant plaintiff, and
would try this fictional plaintiff's accommodation case under the ADA."o If the
hypothetical plaintiff would receive an accommodation, the pregnant woman
would be entitled to one as well.'3 1 Widiss argues that requiring plaintiffs to identify comparators from their own workplace results in an arbitrarily inconsistent
distribution of accommodations, depending on such factors as the size of the
workplace, the types of accommodations and disabilities common in certain lines
of work, and the timing of the plaintiff's pregnancy relative to other workers requiring accommodations. If courts were to adopt this approach, pregnant
women would gain much broader protections.
The de jure comparator theory would be particularly helpful to employees in
smaller workplaces, who are likely to have a disproportionately difficult time locating a comparator, regardless of the expansion of coverage under the
ADAAA.' As of yet, however, the de jure theory has not gained a foothold in the
case law.
III.

PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION CASES AFTER THE ADAAA

Following the passage of the ADAAA, courts have begun to recognize that
conditions that are otherwise covered under the ADA are no longer disqualified
merely because they are caused by pregnancy. As this Article has explained,
whether or not a condition is related to pregnancy is irrelevant under the
amended ADA. After an initial period of uncertainty in which courts' ability to
assess the new legal environment was hampered by inadequate briefing, courts
are now on track toward understanding how to assess pregnancy accommodation cases brought under the ADA. Because we know of no PDA cases in which
plaintiffs have proven that an adverse employment action was because of sex by
pointing to the broader range of potential comparators created by the ADAAA's
expanded coverage, this Part focuses on the most significant post-ADAAA cases
decided under the impairment theory.

130.

Id.

131.

It is not necessary for courts that adopt a hypothetical comparator approach to apply it to cases in which the amended ADA would not require accommodation. For

example, a plaintiff would not be able to argue that, because all the other employers
on the block allow workers to come in a few minutes late, her employer must do
the same. The reason for the use of hypothetical comparators is the achievement of
uniform application of the ADA over time and among workplaces, not the creation
of a universal right of pregnancy accommodation.
132.

Brian Headd, The Characteristicsof Small-BusinessEmployees, MONTHLY

LAB. REV.,

Apr. 2000, at 13.
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Cases That Fail to Recognize the Implicationsof the ADAAA

A.

Initial pregnancy-related decisions under the ADAAA were hampered by
weak representation and by confusion on the part of some courts. The earliest
decisions seemed not to grasp the way in which the ADAAA expanded the right
to accommodation for pregnancy-related conditions.133 Indeed, the first court applied pre-2008 law without even acknowledging that Congress had changed the
statute.' 34 Other courts acknowledged passage of the ADAAA but relied on preADAAA precedent for propositions overruled by that statute.3 5
These early decisions misunderstood the new legal environment in three
basic ways. First, they ignored the demise of the duration requirement-i.e., they
asserted a condition must be permanent in order to qualify for ADA protection.36
Second, the decisions continued to embrace the narrow definitions of "substantially limits" and "major life activity" that Congress (in the ADAAA) said were
inappropriate.137 Finally, the decisions invoked the pregnancy-contamination
doctrine, ignoring the ADAAA's mandate that the term disability "shall be construed in favor of broad coverage."I38
In Selkow v. 7-Eleven, the Middle District of Florida did not even mention
the ADAAA in granting an employer's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs ADA claim.'39 The case involved a pregnant convenience store worker
who sought assistance from a co-worker with heavy lifting due to her back pain.14o
She was later fired on the basis of video evidence indicating that she had stolen

133.

See Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d

193

(D. Conn.

2012);

Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766 (S.D. Fla.
July 25, 2012); Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-cv-4938, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83586 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012); Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-456-T-

33,

2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265 (M.D. Fla. June 7,

2012).

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *37-42.

134.

Selkow,

135.

Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 210-12; Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at

2012

*18, 25.

136.

See Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 211; Mayorga, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766, at
*15; Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *22; Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79265, at *41-42.

137.

Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d, at 210; Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *17.

138.

Wanamaker, 899 F.

Supp. 2d at 211;

Mayorga, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *22; Selkow,
at *37; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4)(A) (2012).
139.

Selkow,

140.

Id. at *2-3.

124

2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *37-42.

2012

103766,

at

*12;

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265,

A SIP OF COOL WATER

She then sued, claiming she was terminated because of her pregnancy. 42
The plaintiff devoted only a small portion of her complaint to her disability
claim.'43 Unfortunately, she ignored the ADAAA and effectively conceded that
pregnancy was not a covered disability, absent unusual circumstances.' 4 Because
the plaintiff apparently overlooked the ADAAA, she also, in effect, conceded that
temporary disabilities were not covered under the ADAAA.' 5
The court appears to have adopted the parties' erroneous statements of postADAAA law. Granting summary judgment to the defendant, the court held that
the plaintiffs lifting restriction did not constitute an impairment of a major life
activity, citing pre-amendment case law.14'6 The court, like the plaintiff, ignored
the statutory language providing that "lifting" is a major life activity,' 7 as well as
the ADAAA's mandate that "[t]he definition of disability. . . shall be construed
in favor of broad coverage of individuals. "14' The court also embraced the pregnancy-contamination doctrine, citing pre-ADAAA cases and stating that pregnancy-related conditions are only covered by the ADA if the pregnant woman
has "severe complications."49
Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Group, Ltd. involved a pro se plaintiff who worked
as an administrative assistant and experienced a series of medical problems following her return from maternity leave."'o When she was eventually terminated,
allegedly due to downsizing,' 1 she brought pregnancy discrimination claims under the ADA and state law." 2
Although the Eastern District of New York acknowledged the passage of the
ADAAA, it acted as if the law did not exist. The court relied on pre-ADAAA authority and asserted that "courts generally hold that complications arising from
$10.141

143.

Id. at *3-5.
Id. at *7.
Complaint at 8-10, Selkow,

144.

Id.

145.

Id.

146.

Selkow,

147.

42 U.S.C.

148.

ID. § 12102(4)(A).

149.

Selkow,

150.

Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-cv-4938,

151.

Id. at *5-

152.

Id. at *1.

141.
142.

2012

§

2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265 (No. 8:11-cv-456-T-33).

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *40.

12102(2) (A) (2012).

2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *382012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at

*1-3 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012).
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pregnancy do not qualify as disabilities.""' "Only in extremely rare cases," it continued, are conditions related to pregnancy complications covered by the ADA.'54
This highly restrictive version of the pregnancy-contamination doctrine sharply
narrows the definition of "disability," ignoring the amended Act's mandate to
construe "disability" broadly."' The court also ignored the ADAAA regulations'
elimination of the duration requirement, stating that "temporary impairments. .. are not typically considered disabilities."'56 However, in view of the fact
that the plaintiff had filed her suit pro se and had not alleged in her complaint
that any of her medical problems were linked to her pregnancy and childbirth,' 7
the court granted her leave to replead her ADA claim in order to set forth allegations indicating that hers was "one of the extremely rare cases in which courts
have found that conditions that arise out of pregnancy qualify as a disability." 58
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint that survived a motion to dismiss. 59 In her amended complaint, the plaintiff followed the court's direction,
alleging that her disability, "chronic cholecystitis," was an illness that had been
caused by her pregnancy.16 o The defendant's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint again relied on the pre-amendment ADA's duration requirement and
its heightened standards for "substantially limits" and "major life activity.""' The
court denied this motion for reasons not reflected in the docket report,"' making
it impossible to judge the quality of the court's analysis of the plaintiffs ADA
claims. The case then settled.'

153.

Id. at *22.

154.

Id. at *24.

155.

42 U.S.C.

156.

Sam-Sekur,

157.

Id. at *26.

158.

Id. While the court's decision demonstrates a lack of familiarity with both the
ADAAA and its implementing regulations, this confusion may have been a result
of the pro se status of the plaintiff as well as the lack of any post-ADAAA precedent.
Accordingly, this case is best considered an "outlier" in the jurisprudence.

159.

Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012).
Order at i,
Complaint
at 3, Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. July 17,
Amended

160.

§ 12102(4)(A)
2012

(2012).

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *25.

2012).

161.

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at io,
Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012).

162.

Order at 1,Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.

163.

Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4983 (E.D.N.Y. May
24, 2013).
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In Wanamaker v. Westport Board of Education, the plaintiff suffered serious
complications during childbirth, including transverse myelitis and a spinal injury."6 4 In addition, her daughter was born with a serious heart defect.' The
plaintiff requested additional medical leave to address these issues, but her employer decided to replace her permanently. She sued, alleging violations of the
FMLA"' and the ADA, along with state law claims.' The District of Connecticut
dismissed (with leave to amend) the ADA claim on the grounds that, although
the plaintiff had described a pregnancy-related condition (transverse myelitis),
she had not articulated how that condition substantially limited a major life activity.168
The court recognized that the ADAAA governed, 6 9 but cited pre-ADAAA
precedent as if the ADAAA had never been passed and again embraced the pregnancy-contamination doctrine as articulated in Sam-Sekur.'70 Again following
Sam-Sekur, the Wanamaker court cited pre-ADAAA cases for the proposition
that the impairments alleged could not constitute disabilities because they lacked
"proof of permanency,"' 7 ignoring the fact that the ADAAA eliminated this requirement.172
The plaintiff amended her complaint, specifying that her pregnancy-related
condition "substantially interfered with major life activities, including standing
and walking, for extended periods of time, as well as bowel functions." 73 The
employer responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, in which it abandoned its argument that the plaintiff did not have a covered disability. 74 Instead,
the employer attacked the plaintiffs cause of action for disability discrimination
by arguing that, because the plaintiffs medical impairment required her to miss
work and regular attendance is an essential function of the job, the plaintiff could
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Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D. Conn.

165.

Id.

166.

Id.
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Id. at

200, 209, 212.
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Id. at

211-12.
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Id. at
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Id. at 211.
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42 U.S.C.
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Amended Complaint at 4, Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn.
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Motion for Summary Judgment, Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp.
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7
not perform the essential functions of the job."'
In the alternative, the employer
asserted that it had granted the plaintiff numerous leaves of absence and thus
could not be faulted for failure to engage in the interactive process. Finally, the
employer argued that the plaintiff had essentially asked for an indefinite leave of
absence or, at the very least, that the employer allow her to work a partial week
and hire another employee to cover the remaining days of the week.7' These accommodations, the employer stated, constituted an undue hardship and the employer was thus under no obligation to provide them to the plaintiff.'"
In her opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff cited the ADAAA; emphasizing the legislature's intent that the term disability be construed broadly in favor of coverage."8 The plaintiff further argued
that she was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than
non-disabled employees and that such comparator evidence created an inference
of discrimination on the basis of disability.'79 With respect to the interactive process, the plaintiff asserted that it was the employer, not she, who was responsible
for engaging in a dialogue regarding possible accommodations that would allow
the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of her job."so Finally, the plaintiff
called into question the employer's articulated reason for her termination, noting
that the non-disabled person replacing the plaintiff lacked experience and, indeed, was relying on the teaching plans created by the plaintiff.'"' The plaintiff
concluded that a trier of fact could easily find that the employer harbored an animus towards teachers who took leaves of absence.' Because the plaintiff had
been on a leave because of her disability, the plaintiff opined, a reasonable trier
of fact could find that the plaintiff was terminated because the employer believed
that the plaintiffs disability would require additional leaves of absence.' This,
the plaintiff concluded, constituted discrimination on the basis of disability.8 4

175.

Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at io, Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012) (No.
3:11-cv-0791).
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Id. at 9-10.
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Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 31, Wanamaker,
899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012) (No. 3:11-cv-0791).
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Id. at 38.
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At the time of this writing, the defendant's motion was pending before the
court. For our purposes, the important point is that, having started out on shaky
legs, this case is now proceeding in precisely the direction called for by the
ADAAA. That is, the focus is not on the threshold issue of whether a disability
exists, but instead on the interactive process and whether or not the plaintiffs
proposed accommodation constitutes an undue hardship. Wanamaker begins
the trend that has taken the case law in the direction of a firmer command of the
relevant law post-ADAAA.
This trend continued with McKellips v. FranciscanHealth System,"' which
involved a plaintiff who experienced "immobilizing pain in her pelvis" as a complication of pregnancy."' The plaintiffs doctor recommended that she take maternity leave two months early and get accommodations at work. In response, the
plaintiff asked her employer for a parking spot closer to her workplace in order
to reduce her walking distance. Her supervisor denied this request, allegedly
commenting that "pain is a part of every pregnancy" and advising plaintiff that
if she had suggestions about changes at work, to "put them in the suggestion
box.""' The plaintiff was fired approximately five days before her maternity leave
was scheduled to begin. 8 8
Again, in this case, there are problems with the plaintiffs complaint, which
initially failed to include an ADA claim.' When the plaintiff sought to add a
claim for violation of the ADA, the defendant opposed her motion to amend,
arguing that the ADA excludes pregnancy from its definition of disability and
therefore amendment would be futile.'9 oThe plaintiff argued that her pregnancyrelated pelvic pain substantially limited her in the major life activity of walking
and thus potentially was an ADA disability.' 9'
The court allowed the plaintiff to amend, holding that "defendant has failed
to prove Plaintiffs claim under the ADA is futile."' 92 The court's holding was
consistent with the ADAAA. Yet the underlying reasoning of the court does not
show a full command of post-ADAAA law. The court did not cite either to the
language of the ADAAA or to the EEOC's implementing regulations. Instead, it
cited pre-ADAAA case law, reciting the out-of-date proposition that pregnancy

185.

No. 3:13-CV-05096,

186.

Id. at *2.

187.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Damages at 5, McKellips, No. 3:13-CV-

2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68069 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2013).

05096 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2013).
188.

McKellips, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68069, at *2.

189.

Id. at *8.

190.

Id.

191.

Id.

192.

Id. at *1o.
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is not a disability "absent unusual circumstances."'9 3 Happily, in this particular
case McKellips's condition was unusual, yet the court's language could be misleading in cases that involve pregnancy conditions more common than the one
encountered by McKellips. Pregnancy-related conditions can qualify as impairments if they interfere with a major bodily system or life activity-regardless of
whether or not the pregnancy condition is "unusual." Nonetheless, McKellips
clearly signals that pregnancy-related conditions can be disabilities under the
ADA. After the plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint, it appears that the
case settled.
B.

Cases That Recognize the Relevant Revisions of the ADAAA

More recent decisions show that courts and plaintiffs are increasingly familiar with the expanded coverage of the ADAAA. 94 While these courts have not
always been presented with well-pled complaints or good fact patterns, they have,
to varying degrees, correctly interpreted the law. In each of the following five
cases, the courts adopted a mode of reasoning consistent with the idea that the
intent of the ADAAA was to make it easier for plaintiffs to establish their status
as disabled. These courts did not use the pregnancy-contamination doctrine as a
per se bar to establishing disability. Rather than relying on pre-ADAAA case law,
the courts looked to the ADAAA and its implementing regulations, which make
clear that the duration of a condition does not determine whether the Act applies.
These five courts also rejected the defendants' argument that the pregnancy-related conditions at issue were not sufficiently severe or unusual enough to "substantially limit" a "major life activity." Instead, they relied on language in both
the statute and the implementing regulations wherein lifting is explicitly referenced as an example of a major life activity.
In Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., the plaintiff had a high-risk pregnancy with complications including "premature uterine contractions, irritation of the uterus, increased heart rate, severe morning sickness, severe pelvic bone pains, severe back
pain, severe lower abdominal pain, extreme headaches, and other pregnancy-related conditions."' 9 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims
for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA, asserting that the plaintiff did not have a disability within the meaning of the Act.9' In

193.

Id.

194.

See Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc., No. ii C 8480, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1oo965 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013); Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., No.
1:12-cv-o817, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3273 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013); Mayorga v. Alorica,
Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2012).

195.

Mayorga, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766, at *3-

196.

Id. at *5.
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support of this argument, the defendant relied on both the pregnancy-contamination doctrine and the pre-ADAAA duration requirement.'97
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court liberally cited preADAAA law. At the same time, the court acknowledged the impact of the
"ADAAA's lenient standards to establish a disability" and purported to analyze
the plaintiff s complaint with this principle in mind.'9' The court held that a pregnancy-related condition could qualify as a disability if the condition caused an
impairment "separate from the symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy"
or if the condition "significantly" intensified the symptoms associated with a
healthy pregnancy, eschewing language to the effect that such conditions are covered under the ADA only in "extremely rare" cases.'99 The court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs disability claim, finding that "whether the nature, duration,
and severity of [the plaintiffs pregnancy-related conditions] are sufficient to
constitute a disability under the ADA" required a factual inquiry. 00 The case ultimately settled.2 1'
The court in Nayak v. St. Vincent Hospital &Health Care Center,Inc. appropriately distinguished pre-amendment case law. It relied instead on the interpreting regulations of the ADAAA, which state that "an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting." 20 2 Nayak
involved a plaintiff who had experienced morning sickness and required bed rest
during her pregnancy with twins. 2 3 While on bed rest, one of her two unborn
fetuses died. 20 4 Subsequent to the birth of her child, the plaintiff had postpartum
difficulties including severe pelvic pain.20 5 Her employer, by his own admission,
terminated the plaintiff because of her "medically complicated pregnancy. "206
The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for disability
discrimination, arguing that the plaintiffs pregnancy-related conditions did not,
as a matter of law, constitute a protected disability because they were temporary.20 7 The cases cited by the defendant included two pre-ADAAA cases and
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Id. at *15-

198.

Id.

199.

Id. at *14.

200.

Id. at *23Notice of Settlement, Mayorga, No.

201.
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(S.D. Fla. Nov.

29, 2012).
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Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., No. 1:12-cv-o817,
LEXIS 3273, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013).
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Sam-Sekur.o' The court distinguished Sam-Sekuro 9 and found the pre-ADAAA
cases unpersuasive in light of the "more lenient" standards of the ADAAA and
"the current change in the law stating that an impairment lasting less than six
months can be substantially limiting."2 "oThe court also cited the interpreting regulations of the ADAAA providing that "[tihe term 'substantially limits' shall be
construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.'" ".This case is ongoing.
In Price v. UTi IntegratedLogistics, LLC, 2 the plaintiff had a blood disorder
that resulted in a history of high-risk pregnancies and four miscarriages. 213 In the
sixth month of her pregnancy, her doctor diagnosed her with an open cervix and
advised immediate bed rest to ward off another miscarriage. 14 The plaintiff alleged that, upon learning of Price's need for a leave of absence, her supervisor
told her, "Your job will be held."2 15 Price nonetheless was fired after her employer
ordered her back to work earlier than her doctor had authorized because, her
employer alleged, Price's FMLA leave had expired."'

The court refused to grant summary judgment to the defendant, who cited
pre-ADAAA case law to support the argument that the plaintiff did not have an
ADA claim because pregnancy typically is not an impairment. 17 Even if the plaintiffs pregnancy was an impairment, the employer argued, the plaintiffs condition was temporary in that it would not continue past delivery."' Not surpris-

ingly, the court did not accept this argument. Properly citing the ADAAA
language that the definition of disability should be broadly construed in favor of
expansive coverage, the court held that the "plaintiff was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA because there is evidence that [she] suffered multiple physiological disorders and conditions that affected her reproductive system.""9 In

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *6.

212.

Price v. UTi Integrated Logistics, LLC, No. 4:11-cv-01428, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
142974 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2013); Complaint at 8, Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974
(No. 4:11-cv-01428 ).

213.

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974 (No. 4:11-cv-01428 ).
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216.

Id. at 5.
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Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
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reaching this conclusion, the court also refused to accept the defendant's duration argument, properly citing EEOC regulations that a condition that is episodic
can be a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity when active.22 oAfter
the defendant lost its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff won a jury trial
based on her state law gender, pregnancy and disability claim, but not her ADA
claim."'
In Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc., the plaintiff, who worked at a fast
food restaurant, was placed on "light duty" by her doctor after she got pregnant." Her doctor later restricted her to bed rest." When the plaintiff exhausted
her leave and failed to notify her employer that she needed additional leave, she
was terminated for violating the employer's attendance policy.2 * Following her
termination, she filed a complaint that included causes of action for disability
discrimination and failure to accommodate.2 5 She alleged that she was terminated due to a pregnancy-related condition,"' and that her employer had failed

to accommodate her by forcing her to work outside periodically.2 2 7
With respect to the plaintiffs claim for disability discrimination, the court
assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie
case. 8 Yet, because the plaintiff had failed to offer any factual or legal argument
for why the defendant's non-discriminatory explanation for her termination (violation of its attendance policy) was pretextual, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment." 9
The court next considered the plaintiffs claim that Portillo's failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation for her qualifying disability.23 o To
establish that she had a disability, the plaintiff asserted that "her high-risk pregnancy and/or the complications she suffered related to her pregnancy" were impairments that substantially limited the major life activity of lifting.3 In support

220.

Id.

221.

Judgment, Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974 (No. 4:11-cy-01428).
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of this argument, the plaintiff pointed out that the ADAAA had "relaxed the duration and severity requirements" for qualified disabilities and that the ADAAA's
implementing regulations expressly stated that an impairment lasting fewer than
six months could be substantially limiting. 32 The defendant countered that temporary restrictions could not, as a matter of law, substantially limit a major life
activity.233
The court summarily dismissed the defendant's argument in light of the
ADAAA's elimination of the duration requirement.2 34 Similarly, the court found
unpersuasive the defendant's argument that lifting restrictions did not constitute
a major life activity." As the court correctly noted, the plain language of the
ADAAA defines lifting as a major life activity.236 Because the plaintiff's nurse had
testified that limiting the plaintiff to light duty included lifting restrictions, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had "presented evidence sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact as to whether her high risk pregnancy rendered her disabled
under the ADAAA."31 Nonetheless, the court granted summary judgment on this
claim as well, finding that the record was "replete with evidence" suggesting the
plaintiffs condition did not affect her ability to work outside.23' The most damning evidence came from the plaintiffs treating physician and nurse, who testified
that there was no medical reason the plaintiff could not work outside.239 In
Heatherly, the court correctly applied the ADAAA to the facts before it. Ultimately the facts presented to the court simply did not support the plaintiffs
claims.
While still in its infancy, the case law shows a trend towards a greater understanding of the fact that the ADA covers pregnancy-related conditions after the
ADAAA.2 40 However, given the misstatements of law in the first several ADAAA
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Some of the early confusion may have stemmed from the failure of LEXIS-NEXIS,
Westlaw and other such services to warn lawyers that many ADA cases are no longer
valid precedent after the ADAAA. Clerks inexperienced in employment law may

well have cited pre-ADAAA cases without realizing that their validity had been severely undermined by statute. Happily, understanding of the post-amendments
ADA appears to be increasing. Even so, Westlaw, LEXIS-NEXIS and other such services should consider flagging pre-ADAAA cases that rely on elements of the pre20o8 ADA that are no longer good law.
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cases, practitioners and plaintiffs litigating this issue should carefully guide the
courts through the meaning and intent of the ADAAA. In briefing pregnancy
cases arguing the impairment theory, plaintiffs should include the arguments advanced in this Article, including: (I) the demise of the duration requirement following passage the ADAAA; (2) the more expansive definition of "major life activities" mandated by the ADAAA; (3) the easing of the "substantially limits"
standard under the ADAAA; and (4) that the pregnancy-contamination doctrine
is inconsistent with the ADAAA's mandate of broad coverage.24
Advocating the first three arguments should require little more than citing
to the plain language of the ADAAA and its implementing regulations. The pregnancy-contamination doctrine is more complicated. The simple argument is that
it constitutes precisely the kind of high hurdle that courts imposed before the
ADAAA, and that the statute was designed to correct. To the extent that the pregnancy-contamination doctrine is rooted in unconscious bias and outmoded beliefs regarding women and pregnancy, plaintiffs should consider analogizing
their pregnancy-related conditions to parallel conditions that are not the result
of pregnancy.
The Appendix is designed to help in this process. It provides medical conditions that produce symptoms similar to those produced by pregnancy. Such information can help plaintiffs who seek to establish that what matters for ADA
purposes is whether a condition constitutes an impairment, regardless of whether
or not it was caused by pregnancy or by another medical condition. When framing their pregnancy-related impairments, plaintiffs should be sure to describe the
condition using appropriate medical terminology. Referring to an impairment
by its medical name deemphasizes the fact that the condition stems from pregnancy.
Finally, plaintiffs should be sure to distinguish pre-ADAAA case law, pointing out that the holdings in those cases now have been overruled by statute. Similarly, plaintiffs should liberally cite post-ADAAA cases (such as Heatherly) in
which the court correctly applies current law.
IV.

SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER THE IMPAIRMENT AND COMPARATOR THEORIES

A.

The Relative Benefits of Filinga Claim under the ADA and PDA

While most women would prefer having a job over being a plaintiff in a disability or pregnancy discrimination lawsuit, a woman who is unable to work because her employer failed to accommodate her pregnancy-related impairments
may have no other option but to pursue legal action. Her claim may be based on
the ADA, in which case her argument will center on the impairment theory, or
the PDA, in which case her argument may have to center on the comparator theory. This Part addresses the relative merits of each.
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A PDA claim may require the plaintiff to produce nonpregnant comparators
in order to prove pregnancy discrimination, either because the plaintiff has no
other evidence or because she has filed her claim in one of the circuits requiring
comparator evidence as a matter of law. In those courts that require a pregnant
plaintiff to find a suitable nonpregnant comparator, plaintiffs often will be unable
to do so if those courts insist on de facto rather than de jure comparators. Moreover, commentators have extensively documented that many courts make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases through comparators.4' They
do so by insisting on a comparator who is a "near twin"243 : whose characteristics
and circumstances are virtually identical to those of the plaintiff. Indeed, one
commentator has argued that some courts' comparator analysis comes close to
eviscerating Title VII by rejecting virtually all comparators except those who are
identical to the plaintiff in essentially every way.4 As discussed above, this challenge could be exacerbated by the possibility that the reasoning of cases like
Young and Serednyj will be followed, and only workers who are not disabled under the ADA will be deemed proper comparators for women with pregnancyrelated impairments.
An ADA claim applying the impairment theory avoids the comparator problem, but has its own limits. While the statute's scope of coverage is broad, it does
not require accommodations for all situations in which pregnant women might
want an accommodation. Some situations in which pregnant women commonly
request workplace accommodations-such as when a policewoman wants to be
taken off the beat and given desk work for fear that she might be hit hard in the
womb during a scuffle or when a woman wants an accommodation to limit her
fetus's exposure to toxics - involve not a current impairment to the mother but
prospective injury to the fetus. 4 5 In these cases, the ADA does not apply because
no impairment exists. At the same time, if the mother becomes extremely anxious
about the potential for harm to the fetus due to toxics or another reason, her
anxiety may be a disability under the ADA.4

242.

See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 755; Lidge, supra note 39, at 849-50; Sullivan, supra
note 41, at 204.
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Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1661.
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Goldberg, supra note 41, at 763-64.
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See Int'l. Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Amerson v. Pinkerton Sec.
& Serys., No. 05-706n1, 2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38671 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2006); Patrice Sutton et al., Toxic Environmental Chemicals: The Role of Reproductive Health
Professionals in Preventing Harmful Exposures, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 164 (2012) (describing how fetuses are more susceptible to toxic exposure than are adults).
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136

A SIP OF COOL WATER

These examples represent instances in which the PDA and the comparator
theory may offer protection not available under the ADA. If the pregnant woman
can point to a similarly situated coworker who has been voluntarily accommodated by her employer-for instance, where other police are regularly taken off
the beat and given deskwork for a wide variety of reasons, or where a co-worker
has been allowed to avoid toxics exposure because her skin breaks out in an unattractive but harmless rash-then she may have a viable claim for pregnancy
discrimination if she is not granted the same right. That is, a pregnant woman
who can point to a comparator who has been accommodated should be given
similar treatment even where the ADA does not mandate such accommodations.
B.

The Theories in Action: Specific Medical Conditions

Throughout this Article, we have sought to emphasize the similarities between medical conditions experienced during pregnancy and non-pregnancy-related conditions with comparable symptoms. This Section and the accompanying
Appendix present concrete examples of some such conditions. While we cannot
hope to cover every pregnancy-related condition, our goal is to further support
the proposition that a particular condition's basis in pregnancy should be irrelevant to an accommodation analysis following the recent amendments to the
ADA.
Gestational diabetes, for example, qualifies as a disability under the ADAAA
because it is an impairment that substantially limits the operation of a major bodily function, i.e., the endocrine function. 47 The EEOC has explicitly stated that
gestational diabetes may be a disability.4' In terms of accommodation needs,
there should be no difference between a woman with gestational diabetes and a
coworker with type 2 diabetes, as both may need breaks for insulin and to test
blood sugar, and both may need to eat small meals over the course of the day.
Hyperemesis gravidarum-the nausea and vomiting that often occurs in the
first trimester and sometimes extends throughout the pregnancy-can substantially limit the operation of the digestive function.4 9 Thus, just as a nonpregnant
employee was found to be disabled where she has gastrointestinal problems-

allegedly later required her to become certified in handling explosives and ammunition, which caused her to become very anxious. The case, which also involved
PDA claims, was settled for $70,000. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n, EDSI to Pay $70,000 to Settle EEOC Pregnancy &Disability Discrimination Suit (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-15-13.cfm.
§
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causing pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea that lasted for about a year 250 -so
should a pregnant employee with morning sickness. Both may need more frequent bathroom breaks, the ability to eat small snacks during work hours, access
to a cot for lying down, and a modified schedule.2"' These accommodations are
also frequently required for diabetes. 25 2
Perinatal depression, which includes both major and minor depressive disorders that occur during pregnancy or after giving birth,5 should be accommodated just as is any other type of depression. Such accommodations may include
time off for an initial meeting with a physician immediately after the onset of
symptoms; schedule flexibility that allows the employee to participate in therapeutic sessions; temporary transfer to a less distracting environment; telecommuting; and leave. 54 All types of depression may substantially limit the operation
of a major bodily function (the brain), or may substantially limit major life activities (thinking, sleeping, concentrating, caring for oneself, and interacting with
others).s5 The EEOC lists major depression as a condition that virtually always
qualifies as a disability.256
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See Wells v. Cincinnati Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 86o F. Supp. 2d 469, 476, 478
(S.D. Ohio 2012).
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CONCLUSION

Pregnant women frequently lose their jobs when their employers fail to provide the kinds of accommodations that would allow them to continue working.
The ADAAA has changed the law in ways that require employers to offer such
(often modest) accommodations, a conclusion supported by important voices
among employers' lawyers. 5 7 Given that the EEOC has cited pregnancy accommodation as an important emerging issue, employers' lawyers would be well advised to begin training clients to ensure that they understand the new legal environment."' Additional EEOC Guidance on pregnancy accommodation would
help clarify any remaining confusion. In today's post-ADAAA legal environment, much has changed. Perhaps the clearest way to communicate this is to
close with a discussion of the oft-cited case of Troupe v. May Department Stores,
a Seventh Circuit decision written by Judge Richard Posner.5 9 Kimberly Troupe,
who worked at Lord & Taylor, had a satisfactory performance record until she
got pregnant and began having repeated attendance problems as a result of severe
morning sickness.26 0 The store gave her an accommodation-it allowed her to
start work later-that did not solve the problem.

6

' Troupe continued to be late

and was fired the day before her maternity leave was to begin because, her supervisor told her, Lord & Taylor did not believe that Troupe would return to work
after having her baby."'
The key problem in Troupe was that Lord & Taylor presented no evidence
whatsoever"' at summary judgment to rebut Troupe's evidence of gender stereotyping-the stereotype that women lose their work commitment after they have
children. 6 4Yet in ruling on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
district court refused to consider this evidence, believing it inapplicable to its
analysis."' Judge Posner upheld the trial court's dismissal,' a ruling in keeping
257.
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with his publicly stated view that it is unfair to require employers to "subsidize"
women, who are more expensive to employ because they get pregnant."'
Troupe is a 1994 case, decided before social scientists had begun to document
the gender bias triggered by pregnancy and motherhood. 6 ' Today, Troupe's testimony that her supervisor told Troupe "I ... was going to be terminated because

[my supervisor] didn't think I was coming back to work after I had my baby""29
would be recognized as evidence of maternal-wall bias-the strongest form of
workplace gender bias. Such evidence, if believed by a reasonable trier of fact,
would be sufficient to support a conclusion that Troupe was fired because of
sex.2 70
Moreover, Troupe's severe nausea would qualify as disability, since it is an
impairment of a major bodily system (the gastrointestinal system). 7' If Troupe
were litigating her case today, she would file a claim for disability discrimination
under the ADA in addition to her claim under the PDA. Would Lord &Taylor's
conduct, then, have been actionable disability discrimination?
It depends. The key issue today would not be whether Troupe could find a
comparator 72 or whether she had a disability. Instead, the key issue would be
whether reasonably accommodating Troupe would be an undue hardship for
Lord &Taylor. A strong argument could be made that it would be undue hardship for an employer operating a department store to have a member of its sales
staff arriving persistently late, but ultimately the answer to the question of
whether this was an undue hardship would depend on facts we do not know.
Given that Troupe's need for this accommodation was time-limited, transferring
Troupe to a different position (if available) or providing Troupe with a finite
leave of absence may have been reasonable.
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cannot dismiss a plaintiff's case on the grounds that the plaintiff has not presented
the particular type of evidence a judge prefers. The judge's job is to apply the legal
test, which in this situation is whether the plaintiff has proved that a negative employment action is because of sex.
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U.S.C. § 200oe(k) (2012); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful DisparateTreatment
of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISsION (May 23, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html.
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In short, in the current legal environment, pregnant workers will not always
be entitled to accommodation. The fact that pregnant women are not, as a matter
of law, entitled to accommodation for any and all impairments related to pregnancy is not the end of the analysis, however. While pregnancy is clearly not a
disability per se, when a pregnant worker experiences a medical condition or disease that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, ADA protections are triggeredjust as they would be if the etiology of the disease or condition was anything other
than pregnancy. Pregnant workers should be treated like other workers with a
similar ability or inability to work. 73 That means they share in the job protections
offered to every worker by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

273.

42 U.S.C.

§ 20ooe(k).
141

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

32:97

2013

APPENDIX

Some Pregnancy Conditions That Commonly Give Rise to
the Need for Workplace Accommodations*
OTHER

BODILY

LYING

MEDICAL

FUNCTION

CONDI-

CONDITIONS

AFFECTED

TIONS

THAT CAN

UNDER-

DESCRIPTION

REASONABLE
ACCOMMO27 4

275

DATIONS

PRODUCE
SIMILAR
SYMPTOMS

Sub-chorionic
hematoma;
placental
abruption;
placentia
previa

Uterine or vaginal
bleeding in pregnancy
is a symptom usually
caused by problems
with placental
attachment that can
result in several
pregnancy conditions
that put women at risk
for preterm delivery or
miscarriage.

Menstrual
dysfunction
(endometrial
hyperplasia;
anovulation);
uterine fibroid;,
von Willebrand
disease; liver,
kidney, or
thyroid disease;
6
cancerns

Reproductive

Time off for
medical
appointments;
bedrest; move
workstation
close to
restrooms

Lumbar
lordosis

Pregnant women
experience back pain
through a variety of
mechanisms,
including the swaybacked posture
(lumbar lordosis)
caused by a growing
belly and the
hormones of
pregnancy loosening
up the joints, muscle
spasms and "BraxtonHicks" contractions.
Pregnancy may also
exacerbate pre-existing

Back injury;
degenerative
joint disease;
scoliosis;
arthritis
muscular
dystrophy and
kidney
infection or
stones

Musculoskeletal

Use of a
heating pad;
sitting instead
of standing;
lifting
assistance or
limitations;
using assistive
equipment to
lift;
modification
of the duties of
the job, such as
temporary
light duty

*

Prepared with the assistance of Drs. Marya Zlatnik and Megan Huchko (University
of California at San Francisco) of the Center for WorkLife Law's Pregnancy
Accommodation Working Group.

274.

Both the ADA and its implementing regulations provide a list of some major bodily
functions that are major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2012); 29 C.F.R.
§

163 0.2(i) (2013).

275.

This section merely provides samples of possible accommodations; the appropriate
accommodation in each case will vary depending upon the woman's condition and
her job. Another excellent source of suggested accommodations is the Job Accommodation Network, http://www.askjan.org.

276.

Blood Disordersin Women-Heavy MenstrualBleeding, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/blooddisorders/women/menorrhagia
.html (last visited December 15, 2013).
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back problems. Back
pain, if severe, can
interfere with major
life activities (standing,
reaching, lifting, or
bending).

277.

Deep vein
thrombosis;
pulmonary
embolism;
stroke

Pregnancy increases
women's risk for
blood clots, which can
occur in the veins of
the legs (deep vein
thrombosis), lungs
(pulmonary
embolism) or brain
(stroke).

Immobility;
trauma
including
broken bones;
severe muscle
injury;
paralysis;
hormone
replacement
therapy; heart
disease;
cancer',

Cardiovascular

Modification
of work
station; breaks
for exercise

Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome

Tingling, pain,
numbness and joint
stiffness in hands and
wrists is common in
late pregnancy due to
changes in fluid
composition and
increased amount of
pressure on median
8
nerve in wrist."'
Carpal tunnel
syndrome isan
impairment that is
much more prevalent
in pregnant women
than the population
generally.79

Also common
in nonpregnant
people who do
repetitive small
motions with
hands/wrists
(i.e. typing) or
after forearm/
wrist injury

Musculoskeletal;
neurological

Occasional
breaks from
manual tasks
or typing;
specialized
programs that
allow for
dictation
instead of
typing

Chronic
migraines

A condition
sometimes
exacerbated by
pregnancy that can be
a disability when the
headaches reach
substantially limiting
levels. Migraines can
limit major life
activities such as

Menstrual or
idiopathic
migraines;
other forms of
chronic
headache
including postconcussion
syndrome;
tension-type

Neurological

Changing
lighting in the
work area;
limiting
exposure to
noise and
fragrances;
scheduling
changes such
as flexible

Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT)/Pulmonary Embolism (PE), CTRS. FOR DISEASE

CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/dvt/facts.html (last updated
Sept. 25, 2012).
278.

One court interpreting the ADAAA has already held that an employee's carpal tunnel syndrome, which impaired his ability to type for more than an hour, combined
with several emotional disorders, including anxiety related to his slow typing, created a question of material fact as to his actual disability. Dentice v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., No.

10-113,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89609, at *7, *32-34 (E.D. Wis. June 28,

2012).

279.

See supra note 109.
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seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking,
learning, reading,
concentrating,
thinking,
communicating, and
working.

headache;'
acute headaches
including acute
glaucoma;
encephalitis

Dependent
edema

Swelling, especially of
feet/ankles, is more
common as pregnancy
progresses, and
becomes worse with
standing. This is
caused by an increase
in the overall volume
of fluid in the body,
leading to a decrease
in protein
concentration or
oncotic pressure
within the circulatory
system. This leads to
fluid extravasation
from blood vessels
into the extravascular
space.

Kidney disease/
failure; heart
failure;
cirrhosis of the
liver

Cardiovascular

Stool or chair
to sit on while
working; more
frequent rest
breaks;
modification
of footwear
requirements

Dyspnea

Shortness of breath is
common due to the
partially compensated
respiratory alkalosis of
pregnancy. A pregnant
women breathes more
deeply to allow gas
exchange for herself,
the placenta, and the
fetus. Breathing more
deeply (increasing
"minute ventilation")
increases the pH of her
blood (makes it a little
more basic). Her
kidneys partially
compensate by putting
more bicarbonate into
her urine. This
physiology is what
makes daily life
difficult for pregnant
women.

Hyperventilation syndrome/
panic attacks;
asthma;
emphysema;
chronic
bronchitis;
cardiovascular
disease; or
pulmonary
embolism

Respiratory

Stool or chair
to sit on while
working; more
frequent rest
breaks

Fatigue

A feeling of tiredness
or exhaustion or a
need to rest because of
lack of energy or
strength.

Anemia;
congestive
heart failure;
lyme disease;
cancer

Neurological;
cardiovascular

Light duty to
avoid
strenuous
activity;
flexible or

280.

schedules or
telework
(which may
include a
transfer to a
position that
provides this
kind of
flexibility)

Benjamin Gilmore & Magdalena Michael, Treatment of Acute Migraine Headache,
83 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 271, 273 tbl.2 (2011), http://www.aafp.org/afpl201/0201
/p271.pdf.
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reduced hours;
exemption
from
mandatory
overtime

281.

Gastroesophageal reflux
(GERD)

Mild to severe
heartburn is common
in pregnancy, caused
by hormones
loosening muscle that
issupposed to hold
stomach contents
down.

Also seen in
nonpregnant
patients

Digestive

Allowing food
breaks as
needed;
providing
space for
medications to
be stored

Gestational
diabetes

This isa condition in
which the placenta
interferes with the
body's normal
metabolism of glucose.
Women with
gestational diabetes
need to monitor their
blood glucose two to
six times per day, and
some may need to take
insulin or oral
medication to control
blood glucose levels.
The resulting high
blood glucose levels
can cause placental
dysfunction, increased
fetal growth and postnatal metabolic
abnormalities.
Complications of
uncontrolled
gestational diabetes
include fetal
macrosomia, shoulder
dystocia, and increased
need for cesarean
section.

Diabetes

Endocrine

Permission to
take more
frequent
bathroom
breaks;
permission to
eat small
snacks during
work hours; a
cot for lying
down;
modified
schedules"

Hemorrhoids

Pregnancy can cause
swelling of rectal veins
due to hormonal
changes, constipation
(more common in
pregnancy), and
increased pelvic girth/
pressure.
Hemorrhoids can be
painful or even bleed.

Also common
in nonpregnant
people

Cardiovascular

Allowing
women to
avoid being in
a seated
position all day
or to use a
special cushion

Hyperemesis
gravidarum

Pregnant women can
have nausea and/or
vomiting that limits
their ability to work in
certain settings/certain
times of day. Severe

Chemotherapy
for cancer;
hepatitis;
vestibulitis; a
variety of GI
disorders

Digestive

Permission to
take more
frequent
bathroom
breaks;
permission to

Interview with Rebecca Jackson, supra note

252.
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nausea and vomiting
in pregnancy can
result in weight loss,
dehydration, and/or
electrolyte imbalance.
It occurs most
commonly in the first
trimester but can
extend throughout the
entire pregnancy and
all day long.

(gastroparesis,
dyspepsia,
inflammatory
bowel disease)

Hypertension;
preeclampsia

Chronic or pregnancyinduced high blood
pressure may endanger
both the health of the
mother and the fetus.
Pregnancy outcomes
range from poor fetal
growth, fetal distress
and intrauterine
demise. The mother
may experience
damage to her kidneys,
liver, heart and brain
(seizure or stroke).
Major life activities
impacted include
performing manual
tasks, walking,
standing, lifting,
bending, and
workingwoi

Hypertension

Intrauterine
Growth
Restriction

Condition in which
the
is not
growing appropriately
inside the uterus.
There are multiple
causes for this,
including congenital
anomalies, infection in
pregnancy, placental
attachment disorders,
multiple gestation and
maternal medical
conditions. A related
condition is low
amniotic fluid or
oligohydrannios.
Complications include
fetal distress, need for
early delivery and
increased need for
cesarean section.

Intrauterine
fetal growth
restriction;
oligohydraicnios; risk of

Multiple gestation
(twins, triplets,
quadruplets or more)
puts women at risk for
many pregnancy

282.
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See sections
pertaining to
related
conditions,
infra.

(2012); 29

2013

eat small
snacks during
work hours; a
cot for lying
down;
modified
schedules

Cardiovascular

Stool or chair
for employee
to sit on while
working;
limiting lifting
and bending
requirements;
allowing work
from home
while on
bedrest and
leave

Reproductive

Bedrest; time
aetus
off
for medical
appointments

Reproductive

See sections
pertaining to
related
conditions,
infra.

C.F.R. § 1630.2

(i)(1)(i)-(ii)

(2013).
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preterm labor;
preeclampsia;
gestational
diabetes

complications.

Perinatal
depression

Includes both major
and minor depressive
disorders that occur
during pregnancy or
after giving birth.
Symptoms include
inability to sleep, loss
of focus, feelings of
helplessness, and
thoughts of suicide.
Depression may
substantially limit
major life activities
(thinking, sleeping,
concentrating, caring
for oneself, and
interacting with

Women may go into

labor or have an
indicated early
delivery and have an
increased risk for
cesarean section.
Providers may
recommend fetal
monitoring in the
third trimester.
Depression

Neurological

Time off to
attend
therapeutic
sessions;
temporary
transfer to a
less distracting
environment;

telecommuting
and leave

others)."3

Preterm labor
risk

Pregnant women may
develop symptoms
that put them at risk
for pre-term labor and
delivery, including
contractions,
shortened cervix,
advanced cervical
dilation early in
pregnancy, abnormal
vaginal bleeding or
preterm premature
rupture of
membranes. In
addition to medical

See sections

Reproductive

See sections

pertaining to

pertaining to

related
conditions,
infra.

related
conditions,
infra.

management,

recommendations for
women at risk range
from modified or
complete bedrest to
inpatient
management.

Symphyseal
separation
(i.e., pubic
symphysis
separation)

283.

42 U.S.C.

Loosening of the joint
on the front of the
pelvic bone (pubic
symphysis) in
preparation for
childbirth is caused by
pregnancy hormones.

§ 12102(2)(A)-(B);

Bladder
extrophy;
injury (pelvic
fracture)

29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2

Musculoskeletal

Limits on
lifting
requirements;
providing a
stool or chair
to sit on; more

(i)(1)(i)-(ii).
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This condition can
result in severe pelvic
pain and limited
mobility like with
some back problems.

148

2013

frequent
breaks

Syncope or
near-syncope

Feeling lightheaded or
dizzy (or fainting) is
common in pregnancy
due to the increase in
proportion of blood
volume going to the
uterus and fetus.
Symptoms can be
caused by heat, stress
or unusual exertion.
The patient may also
experience
palpitations or a racing
heart beat.

Cardiac
arrhythmias;
low blood
pressure;
seizure
disorders;
neurocardiogenic or
vasovagal
syncope, also
known as "the
vapors"

Cardiovascular

Providing a
stool or chair
to sit on; more
frequent
breaks

Urinary tract
or bladder
infection

Pregnant women have
to urinate frequently.
Although this is nearly
universal in
pregnancy, it can also
be a symptom of a
bladder infectionwhich is more
common in
pregnancy. Urinary
frequency can result in
poor quality sleep as
well.

Benign
prostatic
hypertrophy
(causing
overactive
bladder
symptoms in
more than 40
percent of men
over the age of
60); prostatitis
or bladder
infections;
diabetes
insipidus;
nonpregnant
urinary tract
infections

Genitourinary

More frequent
bathroom
breaks;
carrying a
bottle of water

Varicose veins

Hormonal changes,
increased blood flow,
and increased
resistance in the pelvis
can cause swelling and
back-filling of veins in
the legs. This can be
painful and worsen as
pregnancy advances,
and is exacerbated by
standing or sedentary
positions.

Also common
in nonpregnant
people (risk
factors include
family history,
obesity and
liver disease)

Cardiovascular

More frequent
breaks; ability
to sit or stand
as needed

